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Closing and realigning installations has long been a part of the United States (US) 
Army’s reformation.  Since 1988, more than 100 Army bases have been closed and 20 
others significantly realigned within the US.  Since the end of the Cold War, the US 
Army has closed seven of every ten bases in Europe.  These extensive overseas closures 
do not receive the same level of US public attention as those taking place within the US 
but they represent the fundamental shift from a forward-deployed force to one relying 
upon overseas presence and power projection.  To develop closure and realignment 
recommendations for installations located in the US, the Army has developed the integer 
linear program OSAF (Optimal Stationing of Army Forces).  This thesis modifies OSAF 
to study the stationing of US units and closure of US installations in South Korea.  We 
call the modified model OSAFK (Optimal stationing of US Army Forces in Korea).  
OSAFK examines multiple stationing alternatives simultaneously and provides an 
optimal (minimum cost) stationing for a given set of units and installations while 
observing budgetary restrictions and stationing policy.  We demonstrate OSAFK using a 
limited data set that considers 51 installations and 194 units.  We compare the 20-year net 
present value of the total cost and the stationing recommended by OSAFK under various 
levels of budget and find the potential for a substantial reduction to the 20-year net 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since 1988, more than 100 Army bases have been closed and 20 others 
significantly realigned within the United States (US).  Since the end of the Cold War, the 
US Army has closed seven of every ten bases in Europe.  These extensive overseas 
closures do not receive the same level of US public attention as those taking place within 
the US but they represent the fundamental shift from a forward-deployed force to one 
relying upon overseas presence and power projection.  To develop closure and 
realignment recommendations for installations located in the US, the Army has 
developed the integer linear program OSAF (Optimal Stationing of Army Forces).  This 
thesis modifies OSAF to study the stationing of US units and closure of US installations 
in South Korea.  We call the modified model OSAFK (Optimal stationing of US Army 
Forces in Korea).  OSAFK examines multiple stationing alternatives simultaneously and 
provides an optimal (minimum cost) stationing for a given set of units and installations 
while observing budgetary restrictions and stationing policies.   
OSAFK introduces a four-area breakdown to mirror the existing support and 
mission area breakdown for US Army units in South Korea; OSAFK restricts a unit to be 
stationed only to one of a set of installations located within the area where the unit is 
currently located.  OSAFK also introduces the idea of dependent installations that must 
be closed when their supporting installation closes.   
Using the limited data set available for our study, we find a significant shortage 
between infrastructure required by US Army units currently stationed in South Korea and 
available infrastructure.  Our results indicate it would require just under $5.5 billion to 
provide adequate facilities for US Army units for just the 27 facility category groups we 
consider.  With just a small increase above this $5.5 billion, OSAFK recommends a large 
number of installation closures.  Under our assumed cost structure, this recommendation 
suggests the benefit (over $11 billion reduction to the 20-year net present value cost) of 
an extensive MILCON program on a comparatively smaller number of installations.   
After enhancing OSAFK with more realistic training and cost data, we 
recommend the US Army use OSAFK to help guide the closure and realignment of its 



























I. INTRODUCTION  
A recent joint United States Force Korea (USFK), and Republic of Korea 
initiative is the Land Partnership Plan.  Without any force reduction, the Land Partnership 
Plan calls for USFK to consolidate the current small, isolated installations on the South 
Korean peninsula into larger, more enduring installations.  The Land Partnership Plan 
consolidation promises higher force protection, better use of training areas for all units, 
improved working and living conditions, and cost savings.  [Woodgerd 2001]   
United States (US) Army installations in South Korea have unique characteristics 
that differentiate them from their counterparts located within the US.  They are dispersed 
on the peninsula on a mission-oriented basis and any consolidation of these installations 
must preserve the best formation for their mission.   
To help develop closure and realignment recommendations for installations in 
the US, the Army has developed the integer linear program OSAF (Optimal Stationing of 
Army Forces) [Tarantino 2001].  This thesis modifies OSAF to study the stationing of 
units and closure of US Army installations in South Korea.  The modified integer linear 
program is called Optimal Stationing of US Army Forces in Korea (OSAFK).  OSAFK 
examines multiple stationing alternatives simultaneously and provides an optimal 
(minimum cost) stationing for a given set of units and installations while observing 
budgetary restrictions and stationing policies.   
In the following sections, we provide some background on US Forces in Korea 
and introduce OSAFK inputs.   
A. US FORCES IN SOUTH KOREA 
Located in the eastern Asia, the Korean Peninsula consists of 220,847 square 
kilometers with one nation, Korea, and two countries, North and South Korea.  The total 
population on the peninsula adds up to 70 million people.   
The US has a significant army presence in South Korea.  It follows as a direct 
result of US involvement in the Korean Theatre to halt communist expansion following 
World War II.   On 25 June 1950, the Korean War broke when North Korea launched an 
unprovoked attack across the 38th parallel.  The three-year war with a total of almost 
28,000 US casualties, 77,000 US wounded, and 3,700 US missing in action, ended in an 
armistice agreement.   
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Korea is different from other areas and regions around the world.  The current 
state is armistice but not peace.  The armistice does not mean that the war is over; it is a 
suspension of hostilities – an interruption of the shooting.  The war itself has never 
officially ended. [Schwartz 2001]   
North Korea is the fifth largest military with a nuclear capability.  The number of 
artillery exceeds 12,000, tanks 4,000, aircraft 1,700 and ships 800.  In a period of time 
when many nations are downsizing, North Korea continues to add quantity, and since 
1980, they have forward deployed 70% of their combat power to the front lines.  It is 
obvious that they are trying to build an intercontinental missile.  North Korea also 
appears to have the potential capability to produce chemical and biological agents.  Still, 
beyond its capabilities, North Korea has proven it intends to avoid any sincere steps for 
resolution and peace.  For North Korea, the survival of the regime comes above all else, 
even at the expense of millions of starving North Koreans. [Schwartz 2001]   
Currently the US Army has a force deployment of 37,000 soldiers in South Korea, 
with plans to increase this up to 600,000 in case of war.  The mission of USFK can be 
summed up as “to remain vigilant and focused on the readiness,” “actively support 
reconciliation” and “to promote regional stability with forces that have an acceptable 
quality of life” [Schwartz 2001].   
Peak USFK personnel turnover takes place in June and July, and the exercise 
program goes on the whole year.  US Army personnel serving time on the peninsula 
usually experience a one-year separation from their family and substandard facilities, as 
well as extra training and work.  There is a significant shortage in all areas of 
infrastructure, unaccompanied housing, family housing, war fighting projects, and 
support facilities.  The USFK facility deficiencies are estimated to be $7 billion. 
[Schwartz 2001]   
The ideal situation for US Forces in Korea is Balanced Readiness, the saddle 
point between training, readiness and quality of life.  USFK command has a vision to end 
one-year-at-a-time rotations and enhance force protection, sustain training, improve 
quality of life, and increase on-post family housing.  Schwartz [2001] reports, without 
listing specific closures, that these changes will include the closure of fifteen installations 
out of a subset of 41 on the peninsula and a ten-year program for funding Military 
3 
Construction (MILCON).  These changes are essential to restore the installations to 
standards approaching those in the US. [Schwartz 2001]   
B. CURRENT ARMY UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS IN SOUTH KOREA 
1. US Army Installations in South Korea 
US Army installations in South Korea can be grouped into two categories.  In this 
thesis, we primarily concern ourselves with the first category of installation where the 
majority of units are stationed.  The second category consists of separate ranges and 
training areas.  Table 1 lists the 51 US Army installations in South Korea that we 
consider in this thesis. (The Appendix contains a map of South Korea that shows the 
location of these installations.)  The Eighth United States Army stationed at these 
installations is mainly divided in four support and operation regions on the peninsula. 
Each of these installations belongs to a support region [US Department of the Army 
2001a].  This area breakdown not only facilitates the support and supply of installations 
but defines the mission formation of units as well.  Figure 1 shows the map of the first 
category of installations located in Area I.   
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Area I Installations  Area II Installations       Area IV Installations  
Code            Name  Code            Name  Code            Name 
KS021 GARY OWENS KS134 COLBERN KS054 CARROLL 
KS041 CASEY KS399 MARKET KS196 HENRY 
KS064 CASTLE KS670 YONGSAN KS199 HIALEAH 
KS149 GREAVES KS709 K16 AIRFIELD KS585 PUSAN STORAGE 
KS150 ESSAYONS KS970 YONGIN KSA24 PIER 8 
KS155 EDWARDS KSA27 RETREAT CENTER KSA43 TAEJU RS 
KS157 FALLING WATER KSA42 SUNGNAM KSA48 PUSAN RS 
KS180 GIANTS KSA47 AREA II RS 
KS194 HOVEY KS816 TANGO 
KS197 HOWZE KS461 NOBLE 
KS218 CHUNCHON KS165 GRAY 
KS275 JACKSON KS145 
ENGINEERING 
DIST. 
KS375 KYLE KS  
KS378 LAGUARDIA 
Area III Installations  
KS462 NIMBLE 
Code            Name  
KS472 BONIFAS KS151 EAGLE 
KS533 PAGE KS208 HUMPHREYS 
KS599 RED CLOUD KS390 LONG 
KS658 SEARS KSA49 PYONGTAEK 
KS712 STANLEY KSA21 PYONGTEAK CPX 
KS715 STANTON KS045 WONJU RS 
KS996 H220 
KSA08 SWISS SWED  
KSA44 UIJONGBU DIST District 
KSA45 MUNSAN RS RS Residence 
KSA46 TONGDUC RS  CPX Complex 
Table 1.  List of Installations by Area.  The Appendix contains a map of South Korea that 
shows the location of these installations.   
 
Due to limited data availability, this thesis does not consider training ranges 
contained in the second category of installations.  For purposes of our analysis, this is 
equivalent to assuming that (1) after restationing, these training areas and ranges are still 
available for unit training and (2) restationing does not alter the cost to train at these 
installations.   
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Figure 1.  Map of Area I Installations.  Installations located in Area I are primarily 
concentrated in three different locations.  [Figure after US Department of the Army 
2001b] 
 
Some of the installations we consider rely on the existence of a larger installation 
located nearby to supply services to stationed units.  For example, Camp Castle is within 
walking distance of Camp Casey, and Camp Casey offers many of the services not 
available on Camp Castle [US Department of the Army 2001c].  For purposes of this 
thesis we model this relationship by assuming all dependent installations close when the 
supporting installation closes but not vice-versa.  For example, OSAFK may recommend 
closing Camp Castle and leaving Camp Casey open but Camp Castle must close if  Camp 
Casey closes.  This extension was not previously considered in OSAF.  Dependencies can 
also be extended to training assets needed by a dependent installation.  For example, the 
Bonifas Combat Pistol Qualification Course (KS540) depends on Camp Bonifas 
(KS472).   
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2. Facility Category Groups  
The US Army divides its infrastructure into 353 Facility Category Groups 
(FCGs).  Based primarily on OSAF analysis [Tarantino and Connors 2001] as well as our 
analysis of data on unit demand and installation availability, OSAFK uses eight range 
FCGs (Table 2) and 27 facility FCGs aggregated into 13 different categories (Table 3).  
These FCGs encompass more than 36% of the facility square feet represented by all 
FCGs measured in square feet in South Korea.  Tarantino and Connors [2001] find the 
remaining 64% are not significant factors for prior stationing studies.  
 
FCG FCG Description 
F17804 RECORD FIRE RGS 
F17801 ZERO RANGES 
F17831 MACHINE GUN QUAL 
F17852 MORTAR RANGES 
F17864 MULTIPURPOSE TNG RG 
F17866 MPRC 
F17894 INF BATTLE CSE 
F17802 FIELD FIRE RGS 




FCG Group FCG FCG Description 
OPERATIONS / ADMINISTRATIVE 
F14182 HQ BLDG, BDE 
F14183 HQ BLDG, BN 
F14185 HQ BLDG, CO 
F60000 ADMIN FACS 
1 
F13115 INFO SYS FACS 
AVIATION MAINTENANCE 2 
F21110 ACFT MAINT FACS 
VEHICLE / DOL MAINTENANCE 
F21410 VEH MAINT SHOPS 3 
F21885 VEH MNT DOL/DEH 
SUPPLY / STORAGE 
F44210 ENCL STOR INST 4 
F44224 UNIT STOR BLDGS 
TRAINING / INSTRUCTION (ACTIVE) 
F17120 GEN INST BLDGS 
F17138 LIMIT USE INST 
5 
F17119 ORG CLA SSROOM 
COMMUNITY FACILITIES 
F74014 CHILD DEV CTRS 
F74028 FITNESS FACS 
F74053 EXCH RETAIL FAC 
F72200 UPH DINING FACS 
F74046 OPEN DINING 
6 
F74021 COMMISSARIES 
FAMILY HOUSING 7 
F7110F FAM HSG FAMS 
ENLISTED UPH 
F7210P UPH, ENL SPACES 8 
F7213P UPH, ENL STU SP 
OFFICER UPH 9 
F7240P UPH OFFICER SP 
NCO UPH 10 
F7217P UPH SR NCO SP 
AT/MOB SPACES 11 
F7211P AT/MOB SPACES 
AMMUNITION STORAGE 12 
F42200 INST AMMO STOR 
BULK FUEL STORAGE 13 
F41100 BULK FUEL STOR 
Table 3.  Facility FCGs 
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All facilities are categorized into permanent assets, semi-permanent assets, and 
temporary assets.  Depending on their condition, permanent and semi-permanent assets 
are also categorized into the Installation Status Report (ISR) [US Department of the 
Army 2000] rating for the quality of an installation facility type as green for good, yellow 
for fair, or red for poor.   
For computational convenience and to accommodate available data, this thesis 
combines temporary assets and semi-permanent assets and treats them as other-rated 
facilities, while permanent assets are treated as green-rated.  These green-rated facilities 
account for only six percent of the total FCG assets considered in this thesis.   
3. Units and Unit Requirements 
Tarantino [2001] provides data for 194 USFK units with each unit categorized 
into one of ten different types (Table 4).   
 
 Unit Types 
1. 2nd Infantry Division 
2. Combat Support 
3. Special Activity 
4. Garrison 
5. Tenants 
6. Support Forces 
7. Non Divisional Combat 
8. 25th Infantry Divisions 
9. US Army Reserve Full Time Service 
10. Training Forces 
Table 4.  Unit Types 
 
For purposes of some cost and requirements, personnel comprising these units are 
categorized into two overall groups: civilians and military.  Civilians are further 
categorized into two groups: “US civilians” and “other civilians.”  Like civilians, military 
also grouped into two subsets: “enlisted” and “officer” which also includes 
noncommissioned officers. 
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Because unit readiness is vital, adequate training lands and ranges must be 
provided at or in close proximity to the location where a unit is stationed.  OSAFK 
assumes either (1) units can train at any installation within their support area or (2) a unit 
can use only the training assets at the installation where they are stationed.   
Facilities are essential to support to USFK’s mission as well as to provide “quality 
of life” for stationed soldiers.  Quality of life along with training and readiness are the 
key elements for a Balanced Readiness [US Department of the Army 2001d].  OSAFK 
recommends a strategy for improving the existing housing facilities and adding new 
MILCON, a necessary step to make this objective viable.   
4. Stationing Costs  
Closing installations, moving units, and supplying sufficient infrastructure both 
for mission readiness and quality of life requires funding.  As with OSAF, OSAFK seeks 
to minimize the 20-year net present value cost for stationing units while observing budget 
availability and a stationing policy.   
The one-time (or upfront) cost is the cost of implementing a stationing plan.  
OSAFK one-time expenditures includes MILCON to accommodate moving units, funds 
to manage the movement of units to a different location, and to manage the closure of an 
installation that is no longer needed.   
OSAFK can consider MILCON for married personnel and quarters for unmarried 
personnel in response to the quality of life initiative.  There is a different housing 
allowance for each personnel type depending on whether they have families or not.  
Housing costs also vary among support areas I, II, III, and IV.   
Recurring costs consists of Base Operation Support (BOS), real property 
maintenance (RPM), and housing operations and allowances.  The BOS cost comprises 
the overhead cost (fixed cost) of having an installation open, regardless of how many 
units are stationed there, and the cost (variable cost) of stationing individual units at a 
particular installation.   
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II provides a literature review.  Chapter III presents the OSAFK model.  


























II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been a significant number of stud ies on base realignment and closure.  
This chapter reviews some recent optimization modeling to support US Army stationing.   
The Center for Army Analysis developed OSAF for the Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Installation Management, Headquarters, Department of the Army [Tarantino and 
Connors 2001].  OSAF can systematically examine the optimal stationing of a US Army 
force structure (current or future) based on infrastructure requirements, training 
requirements, installation capabilities, costs, and stationing and budget restrictions 
[Connors, Dell, and Tarantino 2001].  OSAF serves as a basis for our development of 
OSAFK. 
OSAF [Connors, Dell, and Tarantino 2001] views a force-structure stationing as a 
tradeoff amongst shortfalls in facility and range requirements, yearly recurring cost, and 
one-time restationing cost.  By varying the allowed shortfall and one-time cost, OSAF 
provides alternatives for a given force structure.  OSAF views infrastructure in 
aggregated facility and range groups and quantitatively measures any shortfall in facility 
or range requirements for stationing alternatives of various force structures.  Because the 
yearly cost of maintaining facilities and ranges impacts the US Army’s ability to maintain 
facilities for training, OSAF minimizes the yearly recurring cost to maintain 
infrastructure at all installations for a given measure of shortfall.  Because there could be 
a large one-time restationing cost to move units to different installations in order to 
achieve the minimum yearly recurring cost, OSAF limits the maximum one-time cost.  
Because OSAFK extends OSAF, our approach preserves all these features.   
Loerch et al [1996] present another integer linear program to assist with 
developing feasible stationing alternatives, evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of 
alternatives, and facilitating tradeoff analyses for US Army installations in Europe.  They 
consider costs (both recurring and one-time expenditures), quality of life of both the 
soldiers and their families, and the accomplishment of mission requirements as driving 
factors for their study.  The cost has two parts: one is the overhead cost of having the 
installation open, and the other is the cost of implementing any stationing plan that 
involves the one time expenditure for unit movement, closure of the installations that are 
no longer needed and the severance pay to local national employees of the US Army 
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whose services are no longer required.  The recurring unit stationing cost is based on 
factors such as the type of unit, the location of the installation, or the cost of living at that 
location.  Quality of life issues center around over-crowding installations and ensuring 
that no unit can be assigned to a location unless an adequate amount of the appropriate 
resources are available to meet the unit’s requirement.  Regarding the mission 
requirements, units must be stationed close to their area of operation and places that 
facilitate their rapid movement.   
As reported by Loerch et al, the total number of units in the reduced force 
structure of the US Army in Europe was about 1,200 and the number of individual 
installations used by the Army in Europe was about 350.  Due to the size of the data, the 
authors use some aggregation of installations and units.  Small units with small numbers 
of personnel and assets are not included in their study.  Combat units, particularly 
infantry, armor, cavalry, and artillery companies are aggregated into battalions.  
Battalions, rather than companies, are assigned to installations.  Some of installations are 
specifically designated for training purposes while others are designated for housing, 
administration, or support.  None of these installations are sufficient by themselves to 
support the stationing of an aggregated unit, but together they supply adequate resources.   
Like the model described by Loerch et al, OSAFK considers some grouping of 
installations.  Specifically, OSAFK considers groups of installations within their support 
area as supplying aggregate resources for training.  Unlike the model described by Loerch 
et al, OSAFK does not aggregate units and OSAFK also introduces the idea of dependent 
installations that must be closed when their supporting installation closes.  
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III. OSAFK 
OSAFK is an integer linear program that enables a systematic examination of US 
Army stationing alternatives and prescribes an optimal US Army stationing for a given 
set of units and installations while observing budgetary restrictions and stationing policy.  
We discuss several key assumptions before presenting a formulation.   
A. OSAFK ASSUMPTIONS AND RESTRICTIONS 
Unless indicated otherwise, the assumptions listed below are consistent with those 
found in OSAF. 
1. Installations  
We require OSAFK to keep special installations open.  For example, we may 
require Camp Yongsan and Camp Casey to remain open because they both have a 
medical center.   
2. Units 
We restrict unit stationing to be within their current support area and we assume 
garrison units do not move even if the installation is closed.   
OSAFK assumes that any unit stationed to a new installation is assigned green-
rated facilities or new construction.  For this reason, OSAFK applies an upgrade cost 
when only other-rated facilities are available and unoccupied.  OSAFK does not upgrade 
the facilities for units that remain on an installation (units that do not move) and assumes 
that green-rated facilities are the last ones to be evacuated by units leaving an installation.   
3. Base Operation Support 
Installations that are kept open generate a BOS cost.  The fixed BOS cost depends 
on the location of the installation.  The variable part is calculated from the number of 
personnel at a cost per person.   
4. Real Property Management 
There is a requirement to maintain facility conditions.  This maintenance cost per 
square foot depends on the condition of the facility and location of the installation.   
5. Housing and Quarters  
We assume, for purposes of housing requirements, that 54% of the enlisted 




6. Ranges and Maneuver Land 
Ranges can be consolidated among various installations.  Unlike OSAF, we 
assume that all ranges are consolidated within their support area and that any stationed 
unit can train at any of the ranges that are part of the consolidated asset.  Thus, any 
installation can supply training opportunities for units within the same area. 
Assuming US Army Forces in South Korea will either retain training land or 
maintain access to important assets after returning them to South Korea, US Army units 
will have the same amount of training land available.  Therefore, OSAFK does not 
include training land requirements and capacities as found in OSAF.   
7. Moving and Management Cost 
OSAFK does not use a location-to-location unit movement cost as in OSAF.  
Instead we use OSAF’s movement and closure program costs.  For program management, 
it is assumed to cost $2.55 per square foot for mothball, $2.41 per square foot for 
transitioning to unoccupied, and $0.36 per square foot for caretaker [Tarantino and 
Connors 2001]. 
B. OSAFK FORMULATION 
For consistency, OSAFK maintains most of the notation found in OSAF 
[Tarantino and Connors 2001].   
1. Indices 
c facility condition (green, other) 
f facility category code (OPS_ADMIN, AVMAINT, VEH_DOL, 
SUP_STORE, ACTRNG, COMMFAC, AMMOSTORE, BULK_FUST, 
FH,EUPH, OUPH, NCOUPH, ATMOB_SP) 
i installation codes  
r range type (RECFIRE, ZERO, MGUN, MORTAR, MPTR, MPRC, 
INFBATCSE, FFRGS) 
u unit 






CAu set of installations where unit u can be assigned   
ISi initial stationing of units at installation i   
MT set of installations where units must train where assigned 
UAi set of units that can be assigned to installation i 
DPDi set of installations that must close if installation i closes 
N set of ranges requiring construction to satisfy any shortage   
S1 set of installations where a subset of installations can train for Area I 
(assets are consolidated)   
S2 set of installations where a subset of installations can train for Area II 
assets are consolidated)   
S3 set of installations where a subset of installations can train for Area III 
(assets are consolidated)   
S4 set of installations where a subset of installations can train for Area IV 
(assets are consolidated)   
3. Data 
All $ are fiscal year 2001 thousands of dollars and all SF are thousands of square 
feet.   
a. Cost data 
Fcosti   fixed cost of keeping installation i open   ($) 
MANcostMu   program management cost for moving unit u ($) 
MANcostCi program management cost for closing installation i 
($) 
maxMILCON maximum one-time cost for military construction 
($) 
maxMAN  maximum management cost ($) 
maxCOST  maximum one-time (upfront) cost ($) 
MILCONcostfi military construction (MILCON) cost for facility 
type f at installation i ($/SF) 
RNGcostri  cost for a new range r at installation i ($/range) 
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UPcostfi cost to upgrade facilities type f at installation i 
($/SF) 
Vcostiu  variable cost if unit u is assigned to installation i  
($) 
CostSustainif cost to sustain old facilities type f at installation i 
($/SF) 
Cost_Newif cost to sustain new facilities type f at installation i 
($/SF) 
b. Range data 
RANmr maximum range days on a new range r (day) 
RANrcapir range capacity of type r at installation i (day) 
RANrreqru range required of type r for unit u (day) 
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allowRNG_S1r the starting range shortage allowed for set S1 (day) 
allowRNG_S2r the starting range shortage allowed for set S2 (day) 
allowRNG_S3r the starting range shortage allowed for set S3 (day) 
allowRNG_S4r the starting range shortage allowed for set S4 (day) 
moreRNGshortr fractional range r shortage to multiply to 
RANrshortr  (day/day) 
ADDRNG_S1r shortage allowed for range r and set S1 (day) 
ADDRNG_S2r shortage allowed for range r and set S2 (day) 
ADDRNG_S3r shortage allowed for range r and set S3 (day) 
ADDRNG_S4r shortage allowed for range r and set S4 (day) 





c. Facility data  
FACcapfic all facility capacity type f at installation i condition 
c (SF) 
FACreqfu  facility required of type f for unit u (SF)  
GREENfi green facility type f at installation i not used by 
currently stationed units (SF) 
OTHERfi other facility type f at installation i not used by 
currently stationed units (SF) 
Cost_newif cost to maintain green-rated facilities of type f at 
installation i ($/SF) 
Cost_sustainif cost to maintain other-rated facilities of type f at 
installation i ($/SF) 
 
4. Variables 
a. Continuous Variables  
agreenfi green conditioned SF of facility f available at 
installation i not used by currently stationed units 
(SF) 
erranir   deviation for range type r at installation i (day)  
milconfi military construction of facility f at installation i 
(SF) 
upgradfi conversion of facility f SF in other condition to 
green condition at installation i (SF) 
rangeir number of  range r to build at installation i (range) 
b. Binary Variables 
exit fi 1 if units moved out of all ‘other’ category of 
facility f at installation i, and 0 otherwise 
stationiu 1 if unit u is assigned to installation i, and 0 
otherwise 
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b. Constraint Sets 
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19 
 
,  1 1
, 2 2
, 3 3
* ( )     
* ( )     





ru iu ir ir
u UA i S i S
ru iu ir ir
u UA i S i S
ru iu ir ir
u UA i S i S
ru
RANrreq station RANrcap erran r
RANrreq station RANrcap erran r











,  4 4
( )     
i
iu ir ir
u UA i S i S
tation RANrcap erran r
Î Î Î
£ + "å å
  (7) 
 
*    ,
i
ru iu ir ir
u UA
RANrreq station RANrcap erran r i MT
Î
£ + " Îå   (8) 
 
*      ir r r
i
erran moreRNGshort RANrshort r£ "å   (9) 
 






_ 1 _ 1    
_ 2 _ 2    
_ 3 _ 3    









erran allowRNG S ADDRNG S r
erran allowRNG S ADDRNG S r
erran allowRNG S ADDRNG S r













  (11) 
 






= "å   (12) 
 




                                             *
fi fi ri ir
fi i r N
fi fi
fi













i iu i i
i u UA IS i
MANcostM station MANcostC close maxMAN
Î -








fi fi ir ir fi fi
fi i r N fi
i iu i i
i u U A IS i
MILCONcost milcon RNGcost range UPcost upgrad










'    , 'i i iclose close i i DPD£ " Î  (17) 
 
0, 0, 0   
0,  0   
fi fi fi
ir ir
agreen milcon  upgrad f i
erran  range i r
³ ³ ³ "
³ ³ "





  0,1   
   0,1     










  (19) 
 
6. Constraint Sets Discussion 
a. Facilities 
Constraints (2) to (6) ensure facilities are available for assigned units; 
existing units use green-rated then other-rated facilities, and newly assigned units use 
extra green-rated, then other-rated (after upgrade), and then new MILCON.   
Constraints (2) ensure the facilities required for each FCG for all units at 
each installation are within the available capacity and new MILCON.   
Constraints (3) ensure the facilities for units that are new to an installation 
(uÏISi) use MILCON and available existing facilities that are green–rated or upgraded to 
green-rated.   
Constraints (4) to (6) ensure units vacate other-rated facilities at an 
installation before vacating green-rated facilities and that these other-rated facilities are 
upgraded for any newly stationed units.   
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b. Training 
Constraints (7) to (11) constrain the stationing alternatives with respect to 
ranges. 
Constraints (7) ensure that all units stationed at a consolidated set of 
installations have their training requirements met (by area and range).   
Constraints (8) enforce a subset of the installations to satisfy each range 
requirements for stationed units.   
Constraints (9) ensure for each type of range that the total shortfall cannot 
exceed some fraction of the starting shortage. 
Constraints (10) ensure that new ranges are built to satisfy any shortfall for 
a subset of range types; however, a new range does not have to be built until a minimum 
shortage is attained.   
Constraints (11) ensure that the allowable range shortfall by area is less 
than the shortfall prior to any realignment plus a possible addition over the original 
shortage.   
c. Stationing Requirements 
Constraints (12) ensure each unit is assigned to exactly one installation.   
Constraints (13) ensure a stationing occurs only to an open installation.   
d. Upfront Cost 
Constraints (14) to (16) limit respectively MILCON, management, and 
total-one-time cost.   
Constraints (17) ensure a dependent installation closes when its service 
providing larger installation closes.   
e. Non-negativity 
Constraints (18) declare the non-negative continuous variables of the 
model.   




























IV. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With 51 installations and 194 units, OSAFK consists of about 7,000 constraints 
and 13,000 variables of which over 10,000 are binary.  We implemented OSAFK using 
the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) [GAMS Development Corporation 
1998] and solved it using CPLEX Version 6.6.1 [ILOG CPLEX Division 2000].  Solution 
time is approximately four hours on a Pentium III computer when accepting the first 
solution guaranteed to be within ten percent of optimal.   
Implementing OSAFK requires extensive data of the variety introduced in the 
preceding chapters.  These data are available from standard US Army sources and 
supporting models.  However, the limited data set provided had some conflicts and 
required some interpretation before use.   
The fixed and variable cost for installations in South Korea was not provided.  A 
data set for installations used in OSAF runs was available [Tarantino 2001].  From the 
available OSAF data, we calculate the average of the BOS costs and round them to 
$40,000,000 fixed and $4,000 variable.  We apply these averages to all installations in 
South Korea, regardless of their size.   
The sustainment costs for green-rated and other-rated facilities also need 
interpretation.  A set of data for total sustainment cost of permanent and non-permanent 
installations are provided [Bassichis 2001].  Using these costs as a basis, we derive a cost 
to sustain green and other rated facilities for each FCG group (Table 5).   
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FCG Description  Yearly green-rated sustainment cost  
Yearly other-rated 
sustainment cost   
OPERATIONS / ADMINISTRATIVE 3.24 ($/square foot)           4.47 ($/square foot)            
AVIATION MAINTENANCE 1.59 ($/square foot)             2.59 ($/square foot)            
VEHICLE / DOL MAINTENANCE 1.90 ($/square foot)             2.33 ($/square foot)            
SUPPLY / STORAGE 1.47 ($/square foot)             2.03 ($/square foot)            
TRAINING / INSTRUCTION (ACTIVE) 2.38 ($/square foot)             3.34 ($/square foot)      
COMMUNITY FACILITIES 2.76 ($/square foot)            2.99 ($/square foot)            
FAMILY HOUSING 2.20 ($/square foot)            3.00 ($/square foot)            
ENLISTED UPH          387.12 ($/unit)                       662.37 ($/unit)            
OFFICER UPH          387.12 ($/unit)                       662.37 ($/unit)             
NCO UPH          387.12 ($/unit)                       662.37 ($/unit)             
AT/MOB SPACES          387.12 ($/unit)                       662.37 ($/unit)             
AMMUNITION STORAGE 1.86 ($/square foot)            2.03 ($/square foot)            
BULK FUEL STORAGE 0.08 ($/gallon)           0.10 ($/gallon)           
Table 5.  Sustainment Costs for Green-rated and Other-rated Facilities.   
 
We had relatively complete data for 48 installations but not for  Camp Chunchon, 
Pyong Complex and Wonju Residence installations.  For purposes of the results 
presented here, we consider these three installations closed.   
We analyze OSAFK results when restricting the one-time (upfront) cost.  The 
upfront cost without moving any units is a little less than $5.5 billion; this cost primarily 
accounts for MILCON necessary to build facility square feet required but currently 
unavailable to the units.  Although no new range construction and sustainment cost is 
added to this figure, it is obvious that this number captures a large part of the $7 billion 
anticipated for MILCON as described by Schwartz [2001].  OSAFK recommends the 
closure of seven installations with only garrison units because we assume garrison units 
do not move.   
B. RESULTS 
OSAFK provides the optimal stationing of units that minimizes the 20-year Net 
Present Value (NPV) cost (equation (1) using the same discount rate found in OSAF) 
while observing all the conditions specified in equations (2) to (19).  We examine how 
the 20-year NPV changes under different values of upfront cost and observe that a little 
increase in these upfront costs provides substantial reduction to the NPV (Figure 2).  By 
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analyzing these alternatives in more detail, we have noticed that the primary reduction to 
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Figure 2.  Net Present Value with Changing Upfront Cost.  The triangle indicates the 
status quo solution obtained without moving any units.  By slightly increasing upfront 
cost above levels required by the status quo, we see a significant (over $11 billion) 
reduction to the 20-year net present value.   
 
Figure 3 shows the number of installations closed with different upfront costs.   
With just a small increase above the upfront cost ($5.5 billion) needed to provide 
adequate facilities, OSAFK recommends a large number of installation closures and a 
corresponding large number of unit movements (over half of all units).  This 
recommendation suggests the benefit (over $11 billion reduction to the 20-year NPV) of 
an extensive MILCON program on a comparatively smaller number of installations (with 
smaller fixed costs).  Management cost (Figure 4) for both closing installations and 
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moving units is only a minor contribution to the total cost.  The majority of the upfront 
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Figure 4  Management Cost for OSAFK Recommended Closures.  The management 










































OSAFK is an integer linear program that enables a systematic examination of US 
Army stationing alternatives and prescribes an optimal US Army stationing plan for a 
given set of units and installations while observing budgetary restrictions and 
stationing policies.  OSAFK is based on the integer linear program, OSAF (Optimal 
Stationing of Army Forces) that was developed to help recommend closure and 
realignment recommendations for installations located in the US.  This thesis 
modifies OSAF to study the restationing of US units and closure of US installations 
in South Korea.  OSAFK introduces the idea of dependent installations that must be 
closed when their supporting installation closes.  It also relies on an area restriction 
where unit stationing is restricted to one of four support areas.   
Using the limited data set available for our study, we find a significant shortage 
between infrastructure required by US Army units currently stationed in South Korea 
and available infrastructure.  Our results indicate it would require just under $5.5 
billion to provide adequate facilities for US Army units for just the 27 facility FCGs 
we consider.  With just a small increase above this $5.5 billion, OSAFK recommends 
a large number of installation closures.  Under our assumed cost structure, this 
recommendation suggests the benefit (over $11 billion reduction to the 20-year net 
present value cost) of an extensive MILCON program on a comparatively smaller 
number of installations.   
After enhancing OSAFK with more realistic training and cost data, we 
recommend the US Army use OSAFK to help guide the closure and realignment of its 
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APPENDIX  
Figures A1 and A2 show the location of US installations in the Northern and 











































Figure A1.  US Installations in South Korea (Northern half of the Peninsula). [from US 
Department of the Army 2001e] 
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Figure A2.  US Installations in South Korea (Southern half of the Peninsula). 
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